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In  June  2009  we  issued  our  annual  update  of  estimates 
of  fundamental  equilibrium  exchange  rates  (FEERs)  for   
34 major economies (Cline and Williamson 2009). At that 
time the dollar had already begun correction from the substan-
tial overvaluation that had arisen from the strong safe-haven 
effect associated with the global financial crisis of 2008–09. 
In this policy brief we report on changes in disequilibria in 
the exchange markets since the date those earlier calculations 
referred to, namely March 2009. We first present estimates 
of the extent of movement toward FEER-consistent bilateral 
dollar exchange rates from March to December 31, 2009, and 
then look at how effective exchange rates have altered in the 
same period. We also re-estimate the FEER-consistent dollar 
rate for one important currency, the Korean won.
We  present  four  major  findings  in  this  update.  First, 
the  overvaluation  of  the  dollar  has  been  sharply  reduced 
from March to the end of 2009, from about 17 percent to 
about 6 percent. Second, the remaining overvaluation of the 
dollar would be completely eliminated if the five East Asian 
economies with seriously undervalued exchange rates were to 
appreciate to FEER-consistent levels: China (whose effective 
depreciation has increased and needs the most effective and 
bilateral appreciation, the latter at 41 percent in the main 
estimate), Hong Kong (32 percent), Malaysia (31 percent), 
Taiwan  (29  percent),  and  Singapore  (25  percent).  Third, 
several economies have experienced such large appreciations 
that  they  have  swung  from  undervaluation  to  substantial 
overvaluation in their effective exchange rates. These include 
Australia, Brazil, Hungary, Indonesia, New Zealand, Poland, 
and South Africa. These economies typically have high inter-
est rates, and their substantial currency overshooting reflects 
the shift in the international financial environment from acute 
panic and safe-haven influences in early 2009 to carry-trade 
dynamics by the end of the year in the face of zero US short-
term interest rates. Fourth, for Korea, a revised estimate of the 
FEER-consistent exchange rate against the dollar now places 
it at about 1,000:1, about halfway between our June 2009 and 
July 2008 estimates, which had shown a large divergence.
The Dollar’s CorreCTion
The easing in the global financial crisis has reversed the strong 
upward pressure on the dollar from the safe-haven effect. Just 
as March 9, 2009 was the trough in equity market prices, the 
March base used for the previous FEER calculation turned out 
to be the high point of the dollar. Using the Federal Reserve’s 
broad real trade-weighted exchange rate index, the dollar had N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
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risen from a trough of 84.8 in March 2008 to a peak of 97.3 
in March 2009. By December, the same index had fallen back 
to 87.0, representing a decline of 10.6 percent in just eight 
months  (Federal  Reserve  2010).  As  a  consequence,  a  large 
number of currencies that were diagnosed as being signifi-
cantly undervalued against the dollar in our June 2009 FEER 
estimates have now approximately reached their FEER-consis-
tent levels or overshot. However, many of these currencies 
were found not to be significantly misaligned on a multilateral 
effective basis in the last estimates, so it follows that they are 
now overvalued on that basis. 
Table 1 reports the June 2009 estimates of FEER-consis-
tent dollar rates for 30 economies (34 were considered, but 
no estimates were made for those that principally export oil). 
These rates are shown for the March base and are also adjusted 
for differential inflation against the United States to arrive 
at an equivalent FEER-consistent rate as of December 31, 
2009.1 For most countries the changes are minimal, but they 
are substantial for the few high-inflation countries. The table 
also reports the percent appreciation against the dollar that 
would have been required to move exchange rates from their 
actual levels in March 2009 to their FEER-consistent levels 
(the rates that would prevail if all other currencies were at their 
FEERs). The same percent change concept is then reported 
against actual levels as of December 31.2 
It is evident in the table that major changes have occurred. 
In the important case of the euro, whereas the currency was 
undervalued against the dollar by about 17 percent in March 
2009,  by  end-December  it  had  closed  to  about  7  percent 
below its FEER-consistent rate. Japan’s bilateral undervalua-
tion had also narrowed but only slightly (to about 16 percent 
1. Inflation rates are from IMF (2009b).
2. Exchange rates for December 31, 2009 are from the Financial Times, 
January 4, 2010.
from  about  20  percent).3  Several  currencies  have  overshot 
from  substantial  undervaluation  to  overvaluation  against 
the dollar, including those of Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa,  Brazil,  Colombia,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Indonesia, 
Hungary, and Poland. Two key trade partners for the United 
States, Canada and Mexico, have both swung from modest 
undervaluation against the dollar to somewhat greater over-
valuation—by about 9 to 10 percent as of end-December.
For  all  29  economies,  undervaluation  against  the 
dollar had swung from about 17 to 19 percent to about 3 
to 4 percent on the average and median measures in table 1. 
Weighting by importance in trade with the United States, the 
overall change is from foreign undervaluation of 17 percent in 
March to only 5.6 percent by December 31. It is evident in 
table 1 that by now only a single bloc of economies remains 
severely undervalued against the dollar: the East-Asian group 
that  includes  China  (still  needing  41  percent  appreciation 
against  the  dollar  to  reach  its  FEER),  Hong  Kong  (still   
32 percent), Malaysia (31 percent), Taiwan (29 percent), and 
Singapore (25 percent).4 They are equivalently undervalued 
against most other currencies. If these economies all moved 
to their FEER-consistent exchange rates against the dollar, 
foreign exchange rates weighted by importance in US trade 
would swing from 5.6 percent undervaluation to 1.0 percent 
overvaluation. Thus, the remaining overvaluation of the dollar 
would be slightly more than fully eliminated if these five East 
Asian currencies were to appreciate to FEER levels.
Changes in real effeCTive exChange 
raTes
What interests (or at any rate, should interest) most coun-
tries is not their bilateral rate in terms of the dollar but their 
effective exchange rate in terms of all other currencies. We 
therefore calculated the percentage changes in the real effec-
tive  exchange  rates  (REERs)  of  our  30  currencies  between 
March and November 2009 (the latest date for which data 
are available) according to the REER estimates of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS 2009). These figures are 
shown in column 1 of table 2. In column 2 they are compared 
with the percentage changes in REERs, against the  March 
base, that were shown as needed to establish FEERs in Policy 
Brief 09-10 (Cline and Williamson 2009, table 2, column 3). 
It can be seen that in several cases where we concluded that 
a depreciation was needed, the result of the changes in the 
3. In late November the yen had strengthened to 87 per dollar, but by year-
end it had retreated to 93 per dollar. 
4. However, see the caveat for China below.
The overvaluation of the dollar has been 
sharply reduced from March to the end of 
2009…and the remaining overvaluation… 
would be completely eliminated if the 
five East Asian economies with seriously 
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Table 1     FEER-consistent exchange rates against the dollar
Country
FEER-consistent rates,  
March 2009 base Actual dollar rates




equivalent March 2009 December 2009 March 2009 December 2009
Pacific
Australiaa 0.7 0.7 0.67 0.90 9.0 –18.9
New Zealanda 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 17.0 –14.4
Asia
China 4.9 4.9 6.8 6.8 40. 40.7
Hong Kong 6.1 5.9 7.8 7.8 7.9 .
India 45 47 51 47 14.1 –1.5
Indonesia 9,707 9,884 11,9 9,95 .8 –5.0
Japan 8 80 98 9 19.5 16.1
Koreab 1,197 1,01 1,450 1,164 1.1 –.0
Malaysia .6 .6 .67 .4 9.5 0.5
Philippines 40 40 49 46 1. 14.8
Singapore 1.15 1.1 1.5 1.40 .0 4.7
Taiwan 5. 4.9 4. .0 6.1 8.5
Thailand 9.5 9.7 5.7 . 1.0 1.4
Middle East/Africa
Israel .69 .6 4.17 .79 1.0 4.
South Africa 9.5 9.8 10.0 7.4 5.0 –5.
Europe
Czech Republic 17.9 17.8 1.0 18.4 17. .5
Euro areaa 1.5 1.54 1.1 1.4 16.8 7.
Hungary 198 05 4 188 18. –8.0
Poland .10 .1 .56 .86 14.8 –8.7
Sweden 6.6 6.7 8.6 7.1 9.5 6.6
Switzerland 0.90 0.89 1.16 1.0 8.9 16.6
Turkey 1.46 1.51 1.71 1.50 17.1 –0.5
United Kingdoma 1.65 1.65 1.4 1.61 16. .5
Western Hemisphere
Argentina .17 .5 .66 .80 15.5 16.9
Brazil .0 .06 . 1.74 14.9 –15.4
Canada 1.18 1.17 1.6 1.05 6.8 –10.
Colombia ,55 ,9 ,498 ,04 10.8 –10.9
Chile 549 541 60 507 9.8 –6.
Mexico 14.0 14. 14.6 1.1 4. –8.6
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 0
Average 19.4 4.
Median 17.1 .5
US trade-weighted 17.0 5.6
a. US dollars per currency unit.
b. New FEER-consistent estimate for December 1, 009: 1,011 won per US dollar. See text.
Sources: Cline and Williamson (009); Financial Times, January 4, 010; and authors’ calculations.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
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exchange market has been to push currencies toward effective 
appreciation rather than depreciation: This is true for Austra-
lia and South Africa, and to a lesser extent India. In rather 
more cases where we estimated that the currencies were close 
to equilibrium, the effects have been to cause a substantial 
appreciation: New Zealand, Indonesia, Korea (but see below), 
the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, Turkey,  the  United 
Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. As would be inferred 
from the above, the United States has come distinctly closer 
to equilibrium. On the other hand, by riding the dollar down 
China has moved even further from equilibrium, so that its 
needed effective appreciation is now about 30 percent, in our 
main estimate.5
There is an important caveat to the estimates for China.   
Our annual estimates use as the medium-term baseline the 
longest-forward projection available in the IMF’s spring World 
Economic Outlook (WEO), to allow for completion of lagged 
effects. Our June 2009 study thus used 2012 as the bench-
mark against which to calculate desired changes. The IMF’s 
spring 2009 WEO projected China’s current account surplus 
to 10.3 percent in 2009, 9.1 percent in 2010, 9.8 percent in 
2011, and 10.6 percent in 2012 (IMF 2009a). It was against 
the latter figure that we calculated the change in the effective 
exchange rate needed to reduce the current account surplus 
to a target of 4 percent of GDP, based on a level consistent 
with holding constant the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. 
However,  actual  recent  trends  have  been  toward  far  lower 
surpluses. Thus, for 2009 the actual current account surplus 
was only about 5.6 percent of GDP (World Bank 2009), not 
much over half of the Fund’s projection in the spring. Look-
ing forward, private forecasts place the surplus at about 5½ 
to 6 percent in 2010 and about the same in 2011 (Blue Chip 
2010, Deutsche Bank 2010). The World Bank’s Development 
Prospects Group places the surplus at 8.3 percent of GDP in 
2010, but the Bank’s Beijing office projects a much lower 4.1 
percent of GDP (World Bank 2010, 2009). The latter estimate 
cites robust domestic demand and reversal of improvement in 
5. Effective exchange rate changes needed to reach FEERs as of November 
2009 are approximately equal to those needed as of March (table 2, column 2) 
minus the amount of change from March to November (table 2, column 1).
Table 2     Actual REER changes, March–November 
  2009, compared with REER changes needed 
  in March 2009 to reach FEERs (percent)
Country Actuala                   Neededb
Pacific
Australia 6. –1.
New Zealand 0.8 –0.7
Asia
China –8.4 1.












South Africa . –1.4
Europe
Czech Republic 5.5 –0.4













United States –1.0 –17.7
a. Percent change in REER from March to November 009 (BIS 009).
b. Percent change in REER from March 009 base needed to reach estimated FEER.
c.  As discussed in the text, this estimate (from our June 009 study) substantially 
understated Korea’s FEER.
Sources: BIS (009) and authors’ calculations.
By riding the dollar down China has 
moved even further from equilibrium, so 
that its needed effective appreciation 
is now about 15 to 30 percent.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
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terms of trade, although it notes that the surplus is likely to 
widen again over the medium term.  
Even allowing for cyclical factors temporarily narrowing 
the deficit (unusually large gap between China’s growth and 
that in US and other industrial markets), these levels suggest 
that the IMF (2009a) baseline of 10.6 percent surplus in 2012 
used in our FEER estimates (Cline and Williamson 2009) 
may be overstated and that the next round of IMF forecasts 
for the spring 2010 WEO may reduce the projected surplus.6 
Nonetheless, even a generous allowance of about 3 percent of 
GDP reduction from the previous baseline for  China’s current 
account surplus by 2012, to about 7 percent of GDP,  would 
still leave the effective exchange rate undervalued by about 
half the amount previously estimated, or about 15 percent.7 
The corresponding undervaluation of the bilateral rate against 
the dollar would still be about 25 percent.
new esTimaTe for Korea
As reported in Cline and Williamson (2009), for a few coun-
tries our June 2009 FEER estimates were markedly different 
from those a year earlier (Cline and Williamson 2008). The 
three  largest  changes  were  for  Korea,  Australia,  and  New 
Zealand, which all showed 2009 FEER-consistent dollar rates 
about 25 percent weaker than the estimates a year earlier. For 
Australia and New Zealand the reason was a change in meth-
odology constraining the target size of the current account 
deficit to a smaller range.8 We hypothesized that Korea’s new 
FEER estimate, in contrast, might be biased downward from 
the use of an IMF current account projection that substan-
tially  underestimated  the  eventual  current  account  surplus 
that would arise if the exchange rate in fact were to remain at 
its extremely depreciated March 2009 base.
The new IMF WEO estimates for October 2009 (IMF 
2009b) confirm our conjecture. They report the 2012 current 
account surplus for Korea at close to the same level as in the 
April 2009 WEO (IMF 2009a) despite a sharp appreciation. 
Thus, the 2012 surplus has eased only from 2.9 percent of 
GDP using the March exchange rate of 1,450 won per dollar 
6. Already in October 2009 the IMF had reduced its 2012 estimate to 9.1 
percent of GDP.
7. In our June 2009 estimates the target current account surplus for China 
was 4 percent of GDP, requiring an adjustment of about 6 percent of GDP or 
twice as much as would be required if the revised 2012 baseline were only a 7 
percent of GDP surplus.
8. In 2008 we arbitrarily placed the limit for these two high investment 
economies at twice the standard 3 percent of GDP, or 6 percent. In 2009 we 
added the constraint that the deficit should not exceed the level consistent 
with avoiding an increase in the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP.
to 2.2 percent of GDP using the October exchange rate of 
1,280 per dollar. Using our impact parameter for Korea of 
0.32 percent of GDP change in current account for a 1 percent 
effective appreciation, either the new current account surplus 
estimate should have been much lower or the previous surplus 
estimate was understated.9 
A new FEER estimate for Korea thus seems appropri-
ate. For this purpose we assume that this time the IMF has 
correctly projected Korea’s current account. Because the 2012 
current account of 2.2 percent of GDP is within our band 
of ±3 percent of GDP, the consequence of this approach is 
to conclude that the won is now no longer in need of any 
change in its trade-weighted REER. However, it could still 
require some appreciation against the dollar to maintain an 
unchanged REER in the context of a generalized move to 
FEERs and hence sharp appreciation against the dollar by 
some of Korea’s largest trading partners in East Asia.
A  rough  approximation  of  a  revised  FEER-consistent 
dollar  rate  for  Korea  can  be  obtained  by  applying  Korean 
trade weights to the exchange rate movements that would be 
called for in table 1 to move the individual currencies to their 
bilateral FEER-consistent dollar rates. When this is done, it 
turns out that the Korean trade-weighted changes to reach 
FEER-consistent rates from actual end-December levels for 
Korea’s trading partners amounts to 15.8 percent. This sizable 
increase reflects the importance of China and other trading 
partners that need large appreciations to reach their FEER-
consistent rates. 
Applying the 15.8 percent estimate to the actual end-
2009 level of the Korean won (1,164), the resulting new esti-
mate of Korea’s FEER-consistent dollar rate turns out to be 
1,011 won per dollar. This level is relatively close to the simple 
average of our 2008 FEER for Korea (850 won per dollar) and 
our June 2009 estimate (1,197). At the same time, it should 
be emphasized that the concept of the FEER itself assumes 
9. The 13.3 percent appreciation of the won should have cut the medium-
term current account surplus by 0.32 x 13.3 = 4.3 percent of GDP, not the  
0.7 percent cut shown by the IMF’s figures.
For Korea, a revised estimate of the 
FEER-consistent exchange rate against 
the dollar now places it halfway between 
our June 2009 and July 2008 estimates, 
which had shown a large divergence.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
6
that all currencies are at their equilibrium levels. If the most 
important trading partners remain at exchange rates that are 
seriously undervalued, then the country in question would 
tend to overshoot its current account target if it moved to its 
FEER-consistent dollar rate in isolation. This consideration 
applies not only to Korea but also to Japan. In both cases the 
additional appreciation against the dollar that would be called 
for to reach FEER-consistent dollar rates is approximately the 
same (about 16 percent), but this would produce overall equi-
librium only if China and other key East Asian trading part-
ners carry out the large appreciations called for. But because 
neither Korea10 nor Japan stands in need of a change in its 
REER, if their partner East Asian economies do not appreciate 
to their own FEERs, the Korean and Japanese exchange rates 
are already at about the right levels.
10. Using the revised estimate of Korea’s FEER, not the one on which table 2 
was based.
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